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 A tenacious brand of conservatism, often overlooked in histories of the 
Progressive Era, remained active and powerful in New York State well into the 
second decade of the twentieth century. Republicans from upstate counties and 
cities held power amidst the rising progressive tide and hindered its progression 
well into what most historians classify as the Progressive Era. A basic tenet of 
progressive ideology was the creation of powerful executives at the expense of 
legislatures. Mired in politics, the thinking went, these large bodies could no 
longer effectively deal with the economic and social realities caused by the rise of 
big business and corporate capitalism. Progressive Era political thinkers saw the 
answer in creating powerful governors able to command an army of commissions 
and boards. Staffed with experts, these boards and commissions would regulate 
the corporate giants without interference from legislatures. This scheme might 
blur the line between the executive and legislative branches, but it would also 
achieve the efficiency and accountability so desired by political scientists, legal 
thinkers, and reformers.1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Edwin L. Godkin, “The Decline of Legislatures,” in Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy (New 
York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1898), 96-144; H. Gerald Chapin, “Our Paternalistic 
Tendencies,” University Law Review 191 (April 1897): 191-195; David B. Hill, “We Are Too 
Much Governed,” The North American Review 170 (March 1900): 367-383; Samuel P. Orth, “Our 
State Legislatures,” Atlantic Monthly, December 1904, 728-39; George W. Alger, “Executive 
Aggression,” Atlantic Monthly, November 1908, 577-84; Richard L. McCormick, From 
Realignment to Reform: Political Change in New York State, 1893-1910 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981), 19; John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny of Change: America in the 
Progressive Era 1890-1920, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 141; Robert H. Wiebe, 
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Progressives in general and progressive Republicans in particular found a 
political battleground when they attempted to bring wholesale change to New 
York State government. To be sure, progressive Republicans succeeded in 
implementing some reforms under Governor Charles Evans Hughes (1906-1910), 
most notably the establishment of two Public Service Commissions to regulate the 
state’s public utilities. But they were unable to push through their larger agenda of 
political reform, which centered on the executive budget, government 
consolidation, and the short ballot. That honor went to the Democrats a decade 
later under the leadership of Governor Al Smith.   
Conservative upstate Republicans fought against progressive political 
reform in part because they believed in the strict balance of power between the 
legislative and executive branches. These old guard conservatives distrusted 
executive power and frequently referred to it as “autocratic.” They opposed 
government reorganization and the strengthening of the executive and managed to 
delay the reconfiguration of state government for nearly two decades.2  The 
success of the opposition speaks to the persistence of older notions of government 
and the influence of the men who espoused them. It also highlights the geographic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The Search for Order (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 160-163; Henry Jones Ford, “The Cause 
of Political Corruption,” Scribners Magazine, January 1911, 54-60. 
2	  Hughes was an “early advocate” for reorganization while governor from 1906-1910.  The two 
decades I am referring to begin in 1906 with Hughes’ election and end in 1927 with Smith’s 
successful government reorganization. 
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and political divisions that cut across the state and were voiced by conservative 
Republicans for both ideological and political reasons. 
Driven partly by ideology and partly by the need for political survival, 
these oppositional Republicans from upstate New York opposed the progressive 
political agenda at almost every turn. Many histories of the Progressive Era focus 
on the lives and actions of people who called themselves progressives at the 
expense of those who did not identify with progressive ideas. Yet every historical 
period has dissenters with significant influence on the actions of a dominant 
group. The New York politicians who opposed increasing executive power are a 
case in point.  These conservatives knew their constituencies well and were able 
to portray progressive proposals as evidence of a rising autocracy. They viewed 
legislators as best suited to represent the electorate because of the relatively small 
areas that elected them. This meant legislators had more knowledge of their 
districts and constituencies than an executive who required a statewide vote to be 
elected.3 Republicans controlled the legislature for most of this period, which also 
gave upstate conservatives a political motive for favoring the legislature over the 
executive. 
The popularity of upstate Republican leaders along with the lasting appeal 
of their message made them a formidable opposition for progressive politicians. 
By moving state politics and specifically the opposition to political reform to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See “Brackett’s Farewell Word on Quitting Public Life,” New York Times, Sept. 8, 1912.	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forefront, we can recast the period as one ruled as much by conservatives as by 
progressives and bring into question the conventional story that assumes 
progressive success and pushes non-progressives into the background.4  
Research into the political culture of New York State complicates the 
story of easy progressive victory and hegemony. The effective resistance to 
progressive political thinking is often obscured by Whiggish narratives tracing the 
“triumph” of reform. Old-style politicians, some of whom had held office starting 
in the late 19th century, are often portrayed as the villains in the good versus evil 
struggle for reform. Reform-minded politicians such as Hughes benefit from this 
narrative at the expense of “machine” politicians and political bosses. Yet upstate 
Republican leaders such as William Barnes Jr., Edgar T. Brackett, John Raines, 
and Elon R. Brown – often referred to by historians as “standpatters” – continued 
to lead the legislature and command political machines throughout the second 
decade of the 20th century.5 Historian Robert F. Wesser has written that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  By “conservative,” I mean Republicans who practiced traditional machine politics. They were 
often holdovers from the late 19th-century. Many represented rural areas but some represented 
upstate cities, as well. They may have supported some progressive measures out of Republican 
loyalty, but they battled against reforms that would have fundamentally changed the political 
system. They stood in opposition to more progressive Republicans such as Governor Hughes, 
Elihu Root, Seth Low, and Henry Stimson, even though they shared the same political party. My 
analysis and conclusions are limited to New York State politics. See Robert F. Wesser, A 
Response to Progressivism: The Democratic Party and New York Politics, 1902-1918 (New York: 
New York University Press, 1986), 15; or McCormick, From Realignment to Reform, 233-34. 
5 Wesser, Response to Progressivism, 163. 
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pronounced conservatism reached a “high tide in 1915 and thereafter” in New 
York State.6 
In Progressive Era New York State, the Republican Party was split 
between these upstate conservatives and their more progressive brethren, who 
were generally younger and from areas in and around New York City. The 
conservative Republicans believed in the legislature as the primary representative 
of the electorate, the primacy of the party, and the use of patronage as reward for 
party loyalists. The progressive challenge meant attacks on all three of these core 
beliefs. Party primacy required that loyal Republicans fall into line on 
controversial issues and avoid independence. Patronage meant the political 
appointment of Republicans willing to take orders from the machine over those 
who might merit the appointment based on accomplishments. Patronage allowed 
bosses to retain power over a line of men who adhered to a strict chain of 
command. This line included elected legislators, who had bosses to thank for their 
positions and thus remained under their influence throughout their elected terms. 
Shifting power from the legislature to the governor essentially meant reducing the 
ability of bosses to influence the actions of “their men” in the senate and 
assembly. 
Progressive Republicans sought to circumvent this system of “invisible 
government,” as it was often called. One way to do this was to empower the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 
	   	   	  
6	  
	  
executive. A strong executive – provided he was an enlightened progressive, of 
course – could accomplish much without having to wade through the more 
complicated machinations of a state legislature composed of 201 men. The 
progressive Republicans wanted the governor to define a legislative agenda and 
lead the legislature instead of vice versa. The reformers also saw a strong 
governor as a way to reduce the growing influence of corporate money on the 
votes of individual legislators. Removing regulatory responsibility from elected 
legislators and placing it with appointed boards and commissions answerable only 
to the governor would minimize the corporate influence over legislation. 
Theoretically, independence would allow politicians and members of boards and 
commissions to make decision free of the pressures normally applied by machine 
men and lobbyists. An independent administrator might be a Republican but he 
was not appointed for his party affiliation alone and therefore was beholden to no 
one.7  
The upstate-downstate split had several dimensions, each based on the 
growing influence and size of New York City. New York City added Brooklyn, 
Queens, and Staten Island in the 1898 consolidation and by 1910 accounted for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 14. As Wesser points out, the upstate-downstate split between the Republican Party was 
not always clear cut. There were progressive Republicans from the upstate urban centers as well as 
conservatives from New York City. In general terms, however, the conservatives controlled 
upstate county machines while the more progressive Republicans came from New York City or 
the surrounding counties. The Democrats, in the midst of a long run as the minority party, had 
their share of independents and reformers, as well. Tammany Hall was associated with bosses, 
corruption, and backroom political dealings, and there were certainly calls for reform of the party 
and of government in general. Significantly, men such as future Governor Al Smith and U.S. 
Senator Robert F. Wagner began their political careers in the state legislature during this time.  
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half of the state’s population. Many rural areas of the state experienced population 
loss.8 The rising dominance of New York City threatened the influence of the 
conservative upstate. New York City was predominantly Democratic based on its 
burgeoning immigrant population and Tammany Hall’s continuing appeals to the 
new Americans. The New York City Democratic machine relied heavily on first 
and second-generation Irish Catholics but it also heavily courted German-
Americans and other older immigrant groups. Upstate conservatives, many of 
whom were old stock white protestants, viewed New York City as foreign, 
Democratic, pro-alcohol, and a force to be resisted. But conservatives also feared 
their own party would shift to the left and be dominated by New York City’s 
progressive Republicans. Some of this fear was allayed by an amendment 
approved at the Constitutional Convention of 1894, which made it impossible for 
New York City to secure a majority in the legislature. Despite the amendment, the 
battle between progressive and conservative Republicans would remain centered 
in sectional politics and at times became a pitched battle between the “moss-
backs” from upstate and the urbanites from “the iniquity” downstate.9   
Conservative Republicans based upstate held onto substantial power 
despite the rise of municipal reformers and progressives, preventing the large-
scale overhaul of state government so desperately desired by many progressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 3. New York State’s population reached 9.1 million in 1910, with New York City 
accounting for 4.7 million of that. 
9 Ibid., 6-12, 173. 
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reformers.10 Their resistance to change was particularly evident during the 
gubernatorial tenure of Hughes, at the state’s Constitutional Convention of 1915, 
and in the ensuing campaign against the adoption of the proposed constitution. 
The upstaters’ resistance drove a wedge through the Republican Party and at 
times threatened its political life. In the end, the division cost the Republicans the 





Although the Progressive Era has spawned more than its share of 
historical studies, few have investigated the attempts to shift power from 
legislatures to governors or the ramifications of these changes. Macro histories of 
the era tend to focus on national political and social developments. Historians of 
the 1950s and 1960s sought to define the era through its main actors and their 
motives. Richard Hofstadter attributed progressivism to a group of middle-class 
professionals whose previously secure status was suddenly threatened by the new 
corporate wealth.11 Hofstadter’s “status-revolution theory” argued that the urban 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 McCormick, Realignment to Reform, 7-8.  
11 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., 7th ed. (1955; repr., New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966). 
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middle-class accepted reform in order to better control the rapid changes.12 Like 
Hofstadter, Robert Wiebe located the roots of the Progressive Era in the 
professional middle class.13 For Wiebe, the impulse for centralization that marked 
the era came from doctors, lawyers, educators, journalists, and businessmen who 
were coping with the changes brought by urbanization, industrialization and 
immigration.14 Gabriel Kolko argued that big business controlled the politics of 
the era.15 Kolko concluded that corporate leaders preferred and supported national 
regulation of business over the more grassroots and unpredictable measures 
possible at the state and local levels.16 By 1970, arguments over the roots and 
nature of the era had grown so fragmented that at least one historian argued that 
there had never been a cohesive “Progressive Movement” at all.17 More recent 
histories have acknowledged the fragmentation and have sought answers in the 
actions of average individuals and social groups within the larger context of 
urbanization and industrialization. Steven Diner examined the reactions of 
Americans across the economic and social spectrum, from managers and women 
to immigrants and African-Americans.18 Likewise, Michael McGerr focused his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 132-33. 
13 Wiebe, The Search for Order, 111-32. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-
1916 (London: The Free Press, 1963). 
16 Ibid., 6. 
17 Peter G. Filene, “An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement,’” American Quarterly 22 
(Spring 1970): 20-34. 
18 Steven J. Diner, A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1998). 
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work on “private, intimate life” in arguing that simple, familial relationships often 
played a pivotal role in the development of progressivism.19   
Although important and useful for describing the era’s overriding 
characteristics, these works do not directly address the important shift in 
governmental power from the legislative to the executive branch, one that remains 
to this day.20 More useful for this purpose are political histories of New York 
State. A 2004 article by four political scientists traced the increasing power of the 
New York governor from 1900 to 1927.21 Jeffrey M. Stonecash and his colleagues 
explored the reasons behind the shift as well as the factors that helped Democratic 
Governor Al Smith successfully reorganize state government by 1927.22 They 
also chronicled the unsuccessful attempts at reorganization made by Governor 
Hughes and by the Constitutional Convention of 1915. Stonecash and his 
colleagues argued that Smith was ultimately successful because he was a known 
“statewide politician” who campaigned continuously for reorganization and was 
able to equate increasing executive power with good government.23 Although the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in 
America, 1870-1920 (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
20 If they do mention the shift, it is mostly inferentially in describing the era’s drive for 
centralization and the need for a “unique and indispensable leader” in the political realm. See 
Wiebe, Search for Order, 160. 
21 Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. Brewer, R. Eric Peterson, and McGee Young, “Politics, Alfred 
Smith, and Increasing the Power of the New York Governor’s Office,” New York History 85 
(Spring 2004): 149-79. 
22 Reorganization meant consolidation of state agencies under the governor as well as the 
implementation of the executive budget, which gave the governor more control over state 
expenditures. 
23 Ibid., 178-79. 
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article did mention opposition to executive strengthening, it did not give voice to 
individuals opposed or offer much analysis of their reasoning.  
McCormick’s exhaustive study of the state’s politics between 1893 and 
1910 made clear that legislative power remained the center of the political culture 
during the period.24 In McCormick’s narrative, New York State politics changed 
only gradually until sensational scandals struck the Republican Party in 1905.25 
The scandals led to Hughes’ nomination and election as governor the following 
year. Hughes’ identity as a reformer separate from the now-discredited 
Republican organization allowed him to gain the reluctant acceptance of upstate 
conservatives as well as progressives. The conservatives realized that a 
progressive Republican victory was still better than defeat. Although Hughes 
attempted to move the state in a more progressive direction, his policies were at 
odds with the conservative upstate Republicans, who preferred patronage-based 
machine politics. Hughes “aroused a degree of hatred among the party leaders” 
that surpassed their disdain for past leaders who attempted to show some measure 
of political independence.26 In giving a full account of Hughes’ attempts to 
reorganize state government, McCormick gives more of a voice to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 McCormick, Realignment to Reform, 82. McCormick discusses the poor perception of 
legislatures in the late 19th century early in the book. He points out that every New York governor 
in the 1890s attempted to curtail legislative power. For the most part, these efforts failed. 
25 Ibid., 194-218. The scandals, both of which were uncovered in 1905, concerned the pricing of 
gas in New York City and the purchasing of legislative influence by life insurance companies. 
Hughes’ first public role was as chairman of the committee investigating gas pricing. He also 
served as counsel for the committee that investigated the life insurance companies. 
26 Ibid., 227. 
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conservative opposition. In general, however, they remain obscured by the 
Hughes narrative.  
 
Upstate Republicans and Their Discontents 
 Aside from a four-year stretch starting in 1911, the Republican Party 
dominated New York State politics from Hughes’ election until Smith won the 
governorship in 1918. Even during the Democratic ascendancy of 1911 to 1914, 
Republicans managed to win majorities in the state assembly on two occasions. In 
every other year, the party held the governorship and overwhelming majorities in 
both houses of the assembly. Republican domination at the ballot box was aided 
by the state’s apportionment scheme, which had been written into the New York 
Constitution of 1894.27 Unsurprisingly, Republicans held a majority in that year’s 
Constitutional Convention and crafted an apportionment scheme that favored the 
solidly-Republican upstate counties at the expense of the burgeoning population 
of New York City, which tended to vote Democratic.  
 Convention delegates debated apportionment schemes for both houses of 
the legislature at length, with most of the arguments shaped by the larger struggle 
over who should control the legislature: conservative upstaters or more liberal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 William H. Harbaugh, “The Republican Party, 1893-1932,” History of U.S. Political Parties, 
Vol. III 1910-1945: From Square Deal to New Deal (New York: Chelsea House, 1973): 2086-88. 
Malapportionment favoring rural legislative representatives occurred in “every state east of the 
Mississippi,” Harbaugh writes. “Most of the old stock Protestants who comprised legislative 
majorities were indifferent to urban problems and hostile to labor.”  
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urbanites from New York City. Delegate Henry J. Cookinham, a Republican from 
Oneida County, typified the arguments when he told the convention, “I say 
without fear of contradiction, successful contradiction, that the average citizen in 
the rural district is superior in intelligence, superior in morality, superior in self-
government to the average citizen in the great cities.”28 Cookinham’s statement 
drew applause from the convention. Democratic delegates George H. Bush, John 
M. Bowers, and DeLancey Nicoll argued that the scheme was nothing but a way 
to ensure Republican dominance of the legislature over the coming decades. The 
Republicans eventually won out, as the convention approved clauses limiting the 
growth in the number of senators and assemblymen from large cities. For 
example, the convention approved a rule that prohibited a single county from 
having more than one-third of all senators. Another rule prohibited two adjoining 
counties from having more than 50 percent of all senators, a move clearly aimed 
at keeping New York and Brooklyn from dominating representation. For the 
assembly, the convention established a three-tiered system	  of cities based on 
population, with the small and middle tiers allotted additional representatives 
more freely than cities in the largest category.29 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 New York State Constitutional Convention, 1894, Revised Record of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of New York, 1894,  4 vols. (Albany: J.B. Lyon Co., 1900), 4: 10. 
29 For complete explanations of the apportionment rules and arguments, see Ruth C. Silva, 
“Apportionment of the New York Assembly,” Fordham Law Review 31 (1962-1963): 1-56; and 
Ruth C. Silva, “Apportionment in New York: Senatorial Apportionment in New York, Fordham 
Law Review 30 (1961-1962): 581-650; and Ruth C. Silva, ”Apportionment of the New York State 
Legislature,” American Political Science Review 55 (December 1961): 870-81; and Walter Francis 
	   	   	  
14	  
	  
The 1894 scheme was in effect when Hughes was elected in November 
1906 on the strength of his role in leading successful legislative investigations of 
New York City utilities and, later, the life insurance industry. As counsel for the 
investigative committees, Hughes helped uncover graft and corruption in both 
industries. Both investigations also resulted in significant legislation that brought 
additional oversight to the utilities and life insurance industries. Historians have 
routinely emphasized the anti-boss and reform currents of 1905 and 1906, with 
Hughes firmly entrenched in the lead role. It is true that the revelations, 
particularly the ones related to the life insurance industry, worried the Republican 
leadership heading into the gubernatorial election of 1906. The Armstrong 
Committee uncovered poor business practices within the life industry as well as 
the unsavory ways in which the insurance companies bought the votes of 
legislators. The committee’s findings directly tarnished the reputations of U.S. 
Senators Chauncey Depew and Thomas C. Platt, and state party chairman 
Benjamin B. Odell, Jr. Following the insurance scandal, many Republicans 
recognized that a party reorganization would be needed if the governorship were 
to remain in Republican hands in 1906. Hughes won the nomination after 
President Theodore Roosevelt intervened on his behalf during the Republican 
state convention. Hughes went on to defeat Democrat William Randolph Hearst 
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by nearly 58,000 votes.30 Although other Republicans did not fare as well, the 
party retained a 32-19 advantage in the state senate and a 99-51 advantage in the 
assembly. As Hughes would soon learn, however, the upstate Republican Party 
bosses and their machine brand of politics would not just disappear. In fact, 
Hughes’ tenure as governor was as much a struggle against his own party as it 
was a battle against the rising influence of the Democratic Party. Hughes rose to 
the governorship because of his role in the insurance and utility investigations and 
the scandals that resulted. To retain the governorship, the Republicans needed a 
candidate from outside the organization, one untouched by corruption. 
Conservative Republicans assented to Hughes’ nomination because they knew the 
alternative was defeat at the ballot box. In short, Hughes’ nomination represented 
more of a compromise than a party-wide assent to progressive ideology. The 
upstate bosses also believed, wrongly, that they would be able to control Hughes 
once he was elected.31  
The conservative old guard Republicans clashed with Hughes’ progressive 
ideology almost immediately. Philosophically, Hughes’ beliefs lined up quite 
neatly with the prevailing progressive currents. He favored the development of 
administrative government, a strengthened executive branch, and the subservience 
of the legislatures to the executive.32 In contrast traditional Republicans feared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 McCormick, Realignment to Reform, 224. 
31 Ibid., 197-205, 227-28. 
32 Ibid., 231. 
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executive autocracy and held sacred the balance between the executive and 
legislative branches. They also believed in the primacy of the party. Hughes’ 
attempts at escaping the grasp of the upstate machine politicians scared the 
conservatives, who believed that a divided party would only lead to Democratic 
victory. “He never consults regarding legislative matters with the Speaker of the 
House, the leader of the senate, or the chairman of the State committee,” Barnes 
said of Hughes in 1908. “These men know as much about public sentiment as he 
does.”33  
Barnes, the legendary Albany boss who had transformed that city from 
Democratic stronghold to Republican bastion, typified the conservatism of the 
upstate Republicans. For example, he and other conservatives rejected the 
progressives’ strategy of courting public opinion.34 “What, in God’s name, is 
public opinion?” he asked.35 For Barnes, public opinion could be discerned in 
only one place: the ballot box. For him, the people spoke there, not through 
newspaper editorials or word on the street. This view essentially allowed party 
bosses to set an agenda of their own without input from outside the party. Hughes, 
on the other hand, cultivated public opinion as a valuable weapon to be used 
against the legislature in cases when it would not comply with his wishes.36 These 
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Post, April 15, 1908. 
34 Wesser, Charles Evans Hughes, 105. 
35 Ibid. 
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appeals to the populace, which were in line with the progressives’ understanding 
of democracy as an expression of the public will, rankled the old guard 
Republicans who preferred to keep their politics in-house once the elections were 
over, and saw democracy in more institutional terms. When key pieces of his 
reform agenda were before the legislature, Hughes would often take to the road to 
make speeches in support of them.37 The hope, of course, was that people would 
agree and pressure their assemblymen and senators to vote for them.38  
Upstate conservatives also disliked Hughes’ use of the special legislative 
session as a way of coercing lawmakers into considering reform laws they had 
already declined to pass. For example, Hughes called a special session in April 
1908 after the legislature adjourned for the year without considering his anti-
racetrack gambling bill or his proposed ballot reforms.39 Two years later, Hughes 
called a special session after his proposal for a direct primary bill was defeated in 
the regular session.40 Upstate Republicans were not blind to the reason for the 
maneuver and some, especially Barnes, resented executive meddling in the 
legislature. Following the defeat of the Cobb Bill for a direct primary in the June 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The Charles Evans Hughes Papers, held at the New York Public Library, hold dozens of 
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1910 special session, Barnes’ Albany Evening Journal published an editorial 
laying out the upstate philosophy. The editorial, presumably written by Barnes 
himself, chided those in favor of the primary bill for acting as “sycophants” to 
Hughes, President William Taft and former President Theodore Roosevelt, each 
of whom had joined in the calls for the direct primary. The editorial hits familiar 
high points of upstate conservatism, including separation of powers and anti-
autocracy. The piece’s tone mocks the attempted strong-arming of the legislature 
and reminds readers that the Constitution “was carefully framed to guard against 
the development of one-man power. It is stated that Governor Hughes will again 
convene the legislature in extraordinary session in order again to coerce it. We do 
not believe that even the pride of opinion and the egotism of Charles Evans 
Hughes will dare go so far.”41   
By the time Hughes’ direct primary proposal had been defeated, upstate 
conservatives were clearly tired of the governor’s attempts to bludgeon them into 
submission. Hughes had begun to do so almost immediately after his election and 
assumption of office in 1907. One of his first attempts at governmental reform, 
made Jan. 31, 1907, was to demand the resignation of Otto Kelsey as the state’s 
superintendent of insurance. Hughes charged that Kelsey had not provided 
competent management of the Insurance Department following the 1905 
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investigation of the state’s life insurance companies.42 Kelsey, who had been 
appointed in 1906 by then governor Frank Higgins, refused to resign his three-
year term and defended himself against Hughes’ accusations. This set off a battle 
between dedicated party men who thought loyalty trumped efficiency and more 
progressive Republicans who argued that executive prerogative extended to 
removal of department heads. Kelsey had long been a staunch and loyal member 
of the party. He was closely associated with the upstate machine of Assembly 
Speaker James W. Wadsworth Jr.43 Kelsey held a seat in the assembly from 1894-
1902 and served as comptroller before his appointment to the insurance 
department.44 Even more moderate Republicans had difficulty with Hughes’ 
position on Kelsey, but the staunch upstaters “seethed with resentment over the 
attempt to humble a party faithful.”45 Having failed to obtain Kelsey’s 
resignation, Hughes asked the state senate to remove him.  
John Raines, the senate’s majority leader and an upstate conservative, 
decided to move the controversy to the senate judiciary committee, of which he 
was a member. A month-long hearing that started on March 13 allowed both sides 
to present their cases in a quasi-judicial format. By the time the controversy hit 
the senate floor for a final vote on May 2, Raines had collected support for Kelsey 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Public Papers of Charles E. Hughes, 1907  (Albany: J.B. Lyon Co., 1908), 249-56. 
43 Wesser, Charles Evans Hughes, 126. Wadsworth and Kelsey were both from Livingston 
County. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 131. 
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from other upstate Republicans as well as Democrats. Of the 27 votes against 
Kelsey’s removal, 10 were cast by Republicans, every one of whom represented 
upstate counties. In his speech to the senate, Raines said he did not answer to the 
governor but to the voters who elected him. “When Governor Hughes began to 
use the big stick the end of Governor Hughes was in sight,” Raines said, referring 
to the governor’s attempt to coerce the senate.46 It was not Raines, however, that 
gave the clearest voice to upstate resentment, but Senator S. Percy Hooker of 
Genesee. “It is not for the Governor to coerce the Legislature,” Hooker said in his 
speech to the senate. “… I will not join those who openly declare their feeling that 
the king can do no wrong.”47 Hooker, himself a veteran of the legislature, was 
obviously well-schooled in the upstate philosophy. Not every upstate Republican 
in the senate sided with Raines against Hughes, but his ability to control the 
outcome speaks to his personal power and the continuing draw of traditional 
Republican politics. 
 Old guard Republicans continued to undermine Hughes’ plans for reform 
following the Kelsey ordeal. Historians have credited Hughes with creating 
commissions to monitor the actions of public utility corporations and for staffing 
those commissions with experts.48 Republicans in the legislature, however, fought 
him on this as well. Hughes’ initial proposal, which came before the legislature in 
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1907, was to create two Public Service Commissions to regulate the state’s public 
service corporations. Republicans leading the assembly and the senate ignored the 
bill until they were deluged with mail from angry constituents demanding action 
to rein in the corporations. Hughes’ repeated calls to add telephone and telegraph 
corporations were ignored by legislators for three years. Republicans in the 
legislature also did nothing with some of the governor’s requests to use expert 
committees to study various industries. For example, in 1908 Hughes asked a 
special committee to study the state’s securities and commodities laws and to 
propose changes. When the committee made its recommendations to the 
legislature, they were ignored.49  
After a tumultuous first term, most Republicans opposed renominating 
Hughes for the 1908 election. Barnes was the most outspoken, contending that 
keeping Hughes in office and making the legislature subservient to him would 
essentially destroy the party. “If, however, the party responsibility is to disappear 
and the individual views of Governor Hughes are to be accepted on every public 
question, then the party no longer exists,” Barnes wrote in his Albany Evening 
Journal.50 Barnes recognized the party’s strength – and his ability to control 
members of his Albany machine – was based on the legislature and on a governor 
willing to go along. Hughes’ independence did not fit Barnes’ scheme. But the 
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divided Republicans could not agree on a possible replacement candidate. In 
addition, President Roosevelt endorsed Hughes for a second term and began 
pressuring upstate leaders to do the same, which they ultimately did.51 Hughes 
defeated Democrat Lewis S. Chanler by nearly 70,000 votes to earn a second 
term. Depew, an old school conservative then serving his final term in the U.S. 
Senate, complained, “Any real Republican … would have won by at least 
100,000.”52  
The ideological division within the Republican Party, much of it based on 
the disagreement over whether the governor or legislature should wield more 
power, combined with scandal to cost the party in the 1910 elections. Hughes’ 
much-desired direct primary, which he spent his entire second term fighting for, 
did not pass under his watch, thanks partly to upstate resistance. Meanwhile, 
scandal struck the Republicans. Jotham P. Allds, who had been named senate 
majority leader following Raines’ death in 1909, resigned after accusations of 
bribe-taking. Another investigation revealed more wrongdoing by Republican 
lawmakers in their dealings with fire insurance companies. Former President 
Theodore Roosevelt returned to politics with a progressive plan dubbed New 
Nationalism. Roosevelt began taking more of an active role in New York State 
politics and took control of the party’s 1910 state convention, during which he 
shaped the party’s nominations and agenda. Many Republicans, however, found 
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Roosevelt’s ideas for direct democracy too radical for the state. The lack of unity 
coupled with the scandals led to the election of Democratic John A. Dix as 
governor. Democrats also took control of both houses of the legislature.53       
Anyone who thought the upstate brand of Republicanism died with the 
Democratic sweep of the 1910 elections was soon disabused of this notion. The 
Republicans who regained control of the legislature five years later were 
vehemently conservative. Senator Elon Brown was given wide-ranging power 
over the legislature and newly elected Governor Charles S. Whitman, a self-
proclaimed “constitutional governor,” did little to limit lawmakers. Newly created 
departments related to efficiency were abolished. Legislation providing for the 
creation of commissions and boards was changed to allow for party patronage. 
The upstate-led legislature also passed a direct tax that burdened New York City 
residents more than their upstate brethren. The same elections that produced the 
1915 legislature also produced the delegates for the Constitutional Convention 
that same year. Republicans held a large majority at the convention and most were 
of the conservative upstate variety. Convention President Elihu Root adeptly 
moved progressive amendments through the convention by placing progressive 
Republicans in key committee chairmanships. In the end, however, the upstate 
conservatives would help ensure that political approval at the convention would 
not equate to popular approval at the polls. 
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Conservative Republicans capitalized on a series of Democratic scandals 
to recapture state government in the 1914 elections. The impeachment of 
Democratic Governor William Sulzer Jr. in October 1913 and the ensuing fallout 
began a furious run of anti-Tammany Hall sentiment. Sulzer might have been 
guilty of the official charges, including failing to report campaign contributions, 
but his more serious offense was his refusal to cooperate with Tammany Hall boss 
Charles Murphy on matters of policy. Murphy responded by orchestrating 
Sulzer’s impeachment and replacement with Lieutenant Governor Martin Glynn. 
Although guilty of the official charges, Sulzer was also clearly the victim of 
political payback. Sulzer denounced Tammany and framed his impeachment as 
the result of a battle between the corruption of the Democratic machine and his 
own belief in the forces of law. Sulzer’s anti-Tammany arguments took hold on 
the electorate, with the results visible almost immediately.54 
The building Republican ascendancy resulted in a strong conservative 
legislature that by 1915 received little pushback from a newly elected governor. 
The Democratic downfall had begun in the November 1913 elections, when 
Republicans erased the large Democratic majority in the assembly. Benefitting 
from public sympathy, Sulzer was elected to the assembly as a member of the 
Progressive Party representing Nassau County. The anti-Tammany hangover 
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continued into the 1914 elections. Glynn, the main beneficiary of Tammany’s 
political war against Sulzer, was easily defeated by Republican Charles S. 
Whitman. Republicans gained majorities in both houses of the legislature for the 
first time since 1910. This time, however, there was less of a progressive element 
to keep the conservative wing of the party in check. Whitman, a former New York 
County prosecutor who led the party’s progressive wing, had little history as a 
reformer. His unwillingness to whip the legislature allowed upstaters to dominate 
policymaking in his two terms as governor. Elon R. Brown of Watertown, the 
“Czar of the Senate,” and Assembly Speaker Thaddeus Sweet of Oswego 
provided the Republican leadership in the legislature during these years.55 Brown, 
a senate veteran, managed to have himself appointed head of a joint legislative 
caucus that allowed him to control legislation and to appoint whoever he wished 
to senate committees. A New York Times story on Brown’s maneuvering pointed 
out that “Gov. Whitman seems to have been left out of the reckoning entirely in 
this new and extraordinary arrangement at the Capitol.”56 The New York Tribune 
echoed the Times, reporting, “Some see in it the practical elimination of the 
Governor from a real voice in legislation.”57 In addition, Republicans held two-
thirds majorities in both houses, meaning Whitman’s veto could be overridden 
without help from Democrats.  
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Wesser has labeled the 1915 session of the New York Legislature the 
“most partisan and reactionary” of any that sat during Whitman’s governorship.58 
Conservative Republicans were responsible for the passage of a direct tax, which 
disproportionately burdened New York City residents. Much of the new revenue 
wound up paying for roads in the conservative upstate. Conservatives also 
tinkered with past reform legislation, creating a gubernatorially-appointed 
industrial commission to oversee the work of the newly established workmen’s 
compensation commission and the labor department. The law creating the 
Efficiency and Economy Department was repealed and the state’s conservation 
commission was reorganized to favor party patronage. Legislation was also 
introduced to roll back regulations on upstate canneries and to reduce oversight of 
mercantile establishments. Democrats in the legislature, led by rising leaders Al 
Smith and Robert F. Wagner, roundly criticized the session as “hypocritical, 
arbitrary, avaricious, reactionary, and destructive.”59 Upstate conservatives, 
however, were clearly in control of the state’s agenda and were intent on rolling 
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The Constitutional Convention of 1915 
The Republican rout of 1914 also gave the party control of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1915.60 The New York Constitution of 1894 had set 
1916 as the date for the next convention, subject to the approval of the voters. The 
Democrats, having held the governorship and at least one house of the legislature 
between 1911 and 1914, began advocating for an earlier convention, thinking they 
would be able to control it. They were desperate to rewrite the apportionment 
provision of the 1894 Constitution that kept rural Republicans in power at the 
expense of urban Democrats. The Democrats’ largest miscalculation, however, 
was believing that Sulzer’s impeachment would only affect the elections of 
November 1913. Two months after the impeachment – and in spite of it and the 
ensuing fallout – the Democratic legislature voted to set April 1914 as the date of 
the referendum on the convention. A disappointing 13-percent turnout approved 
the convention for the following year by the narrow margin of 153,322 to 
151,969. The convention was approved in only nine of the state’s 62 counties, but 
the large majorities provided by the counties of New York City offset the 
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upstate’s decided lack of interest. In fact, all but four upstate counties voted 
against a convention. Two of those four counties, Erie and Onondaga, voted in 
favor largely on the strength of their major cities, Buffalo and Syracuse. The 168 
delegates to the convention – three from each state senatorial district – were 
chosen in the same November election in which Whitman and the Republicans 
swept back into office. Unsurprisingly, Republicans also dominated the delegate 
elections, winning 116 of the total seats, including all 15 at-large spots. This 
meant the party would control the convention machinery and set its agenda.61   
Despite the Republicans’ sweeping victory at the polls, internal division 
continued to plague the party and hindered the agendas of the progressives and 
the conservatives. The schism of 1912 in which Theodore Roosevelt and other 
progressives had bolted for the Bull Moose Party still hampered party unity even 
though many progressives had since returned to the party. The upstate-downstate 
division was still very much a factor in terms of ideological divisions in the party, 
with the upstate being home to the more conservative Republican politicians and 
New York City the base for the progressive Republicans. 
The smaller, more progressive wing of the party grabbed the convention’s 
leadership and set an agenda centered on the reorganization of the state 
government around a more powerful executive. This group, dubbed the “federal 
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crowd,” was led by convention president Elihu Root. He along with delegates 
Henry Stimson, Seth Low, Herbert Parsons, Frederick Tanner, and George 
Wickersham shared a house on Elk Street in Albany throughout the five months 
of the convention. Although Old Guard Republicans held superior numbers, 
Root’s appointment of his “federal crowd” allies and other progressive-minded 
Republicans to key committee chairmanships ensured they would not be 
outmaneuvered by their more conservative brethren. For instance, he appointed 
Wickersham to the chairmanship of the judiciary committee, which controlled the 
floor of the convention.62 Stimson led the committee on state finances and Tanner 
the committee of the governor and other state officers. These committees would 
play a key role if the progressive agenda was to be fulfilled at the convention. 
Root also carefully planned the witnesses who would testify before each 
committee. The witnesses, who included former President William Taft, U.S. 
Senator James W. Wadsworth, and Johns Hopkins President Frank J. Goodnow, 
among many others, were generally in favor of government re-organization.63  
The reorganization advocated by progressive Republicans included 
creating the executive budget, government consolidation, and the short ballot. The 
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budgetary system in place at the time called for executive department heads to 
send budget estimates directly to the legislature, which would then weed through 
the dozens of separate requests to revise and eventually approve them. The 
amendment sought to have department heads send their proposed budgets to the 
governor instead. The governor would conduct public hearings on the requests 
and then make any appropriate changes. The revised budget would then go to the 
legislature for review and approval. At that point, the legislature would be 
restricted to reducing expenditures.64 The short ballot meant making more 
governmental positions answerable to the governor instead of the electorate. 
Tanner’s committee proposed an amendment that would leave only the positions 
of governor, lieutenant governor, comptroller, and attorney general on the ballot. 
The amendment consolidated state government from the existing 169 department 
bureaus, commissions, boards, and committees into 17 departments, the heads of 
which would be appointed by the governor with advice from the senate. Under the 
amendment, neither the governor nor the legislature could create new departments 
but the legislature could assign new functions to the 17 departments.65 Both 
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proposals were in line with progressive thinking in that their goal was to center 
power in the governor to increase accountability and efficiency.  
 The conservative Republicans from upstate opposed these measures 
because they viewed a strong executive as a threat to legislative power. They also 
sent a seasoned contingent to the convention. Barnes, the longtime Republican 
boss, represented Albany County. Former U.S. congressman Lemuel Quigg – a 
former lieutenant to Boss Platt – represented Columbia, Duchess, and Putnam 
Counties. Brackett, a veteran of the New York legislature until his retirement in 
1912, was an at-large delegate. He provided the upstate’s leadership during the 
convention, as Barnes’ will for politics had been partially sapped by his loss to 
Theodore Roosevelt in an unrelated libel lawsuit. Root’s decision to appoint 
Wickersham as chairman of the judiciary committee angered Brackett, who had 
served as chairman of the state’s senate judiciary committee for eight years. 
Although he had always voiced anti-reorganization views, this snubbing only 
intensified Brackett’s resistance to everything on Root’s agenda.66 He had been 
appointed chairman of the committee on the legislature and its organization and 
also held a spot on the committee on legislative powers, two appointments that fit 
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his interest in protecting legislative power or at least tamping down executive 
prerogative.67  
Brackett’s influence on other upstate conservative delegates was 
substantial. Years later, Tanner remembered him as the “gadfly” of the 
convention, but he was far more than that.68 Tanner, the state party chairman and 
a pro-reorganization Republican from New York City, was approached by 
Brackett one afternoon following a day of convention proceedings. “Young 
fellow, I would like to bring over a group of real Republicans some night to see 
you and tell you just what they think of you,” Brackett scowled. The two agreed 
to meet later that evening in the lieutenant governor’s room at the capitol. 
Brackett and about 16 or 17 men “stalked” into the room at the appointed time. 
Tanner declined to name the other men, but presumably they were other 
convention delegates. “I could see fire in the old senator’s eye,” he recalled. In 
Tanner’s recollection of the meeting – and of the convention for that matter – 
Brackett held long-standing resentments against his less conservative fellow 
Republicans from downstate. “Well, we at last came back in this last election and 
it has been at least 10 years since we got any jobs,” Brackett said at the meeting 
with Tanner, “because God knows we didn’t get any when Hughes was 
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governor.”69 Clearly, Brackett had been irked by Hughes’ tendency to minimize 
the party at the expense of patronage. In Tanner’s recollection of the meeting, 
Brackett also complained about the proposed reorganization plan, which he called 
“dictatorial, aristocratic and anti-democratic.”70 He also told Tanner he wanted 
more men on the ballot, not fewer.71 Brackett’s lengthy speeches during the 
constitutional convention do nothing to undermine Tanner’s recollection of his 
views.  
Still, the Saratogan’s suspicion of executive power was not something that 
simply appeared during the convention. Brackett’s feelings on the issue appear in 
debates and news stories throughout his political career.72 In a 1909 debate over 
Hughes’ direct primary law, Brackett, then a state senator representing Saratoga 
and Washington counties, referred to Hughes’ governorship as the “reign of 
Charles.”73 A 1912 New York Times story about his retirement from the New 
York Legislature is perhaps the best statement of Brackett’s philosophy and fear 
of executive power. For him, the integral balance between the legislative, judicial, 
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and executive branches, so carefully crafted by the Founders, had begun to shift 
too far in the direction of the executive. He believed that elected representatives 
and senators and their proximity to the people should have put them in positions 
of key importance. “It cannot be that the Executive branch of Government is 
infallible; it cannot be that there are not times when it should be controlled and 
perhaps thwarted.” 74 Brackett boldly predicted, “When the final cataclysm comes 
to the American system of government it will not result from any weakening of 
the executive or of the judicial functions, but from a failure of the legislative.”75 
Brackett meant that legislatures would “fail” because they had been 
disempowered in favor of the executive branch. For him, the solution was to 
strengthen legislatures to restore the balance provided by the Founders. He used a 
physical example to make his point: “If my right arm develops an atrophy, I do 
not attempt to develop the left so that it will have the strength to serve for both. I 
have treated the ailing arm to see if its decay cannot be arrested and the failing 
arm restored to its former strength.”76 
Brackett was the clear leader of the upstate conservatives at the 
convention, but others, such as Lemuel Quigg, held similar views on the short 
ballot and the re-organization. Quigg, a newspaper editor, former member of 
Congress, and lawyer, held a spot on Brackett’s committee on the legislature and 
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its organization. His work and views would become more important during the 
campaign against ratification of the proposed constitution. Years later, Quigg’s 
son, Murray T. Quigg, would remember his father’s stance on the short ballot and 
reorganization: “If it was ever an issue between efficiency and the greater 
concentration of power, on one hand, with relative inefficiency and distribution of 
power on the other, my father invariably opposed the concentration of power.”77 
Barnes spent whatever energy he had left campaigning against the progressive 
agenda and condemning as “socialism” recent legislation that provided for 
worker’s compensation, a minimum wage, and widows’ pensions.78  
Although Barnes and Brackett were aligned in their views on the short 
ballot, consolidation, and the executive budget, they were conservatives of 
different sorts. Barnes, who never held elected office, was more concerned with 
individual liberties and viewed most progressive initiatives as intrusions on those 
liberties.79 He denounced Theodore Roosevelt’s 1912 presidential platform of 
New Nationalism as “demagogic” and antagonistic to property rights.80 
Progressive concepts such as the recall of judicial decisions were anathema to 
Barnes for this reason, and his distrust of executives came from the fear of 
infringement on individual rights. He also believed the real threat to freedom 
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came from the “autocracy” of the collective will. “The concept of a democratic 
state where equality is the basis of all law is in direct antagonism to the concept of 
the autocratic state where everyone is made subject to what is declared to be the 
collective interest,” Barnes said. “From the latter tyranny there is no escape 
except through revolution.”81 Unlike Brackett, however, Barnes did not favor 
legislative strengthening, as he felt legislatures were just as much of a threat to 
property as executives.82 In short, Barnes was a less-government conservative. 
Brackett, who spent all of his active years as an elected state representative, did 
not employ the typical conservative refrain of “socialism” to legislation he 
disagreed with. He may have disagreed with progressive laws, but he did not 
frame the contested issues as “democracy versus socialism” as Barnes did. 
Brackett’s concern was more about the balance between the branches. “The great 
danger of the present time is not corruption, nor socialism, nor distrust of the 
judiciary,” Brackett said in 1912. “It is the gradual turning away of the people 
from their constitutionally selected legislators, and their growing faith in a law-
making executive.”83 Barnes and Brackett, both veterans of New York state 
politics by 1915, provided the two most important conservative voices both 
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during the convention and in the campaign against ratification. Quigg and Elon 
Brown, who was not a delegate but did wield significant political power, would 
also play prominent in roles in the proposed constitution’s defeat in November 
1915. In resisting, these men were attempting to keep in place the political system 
that they and the Republicans had dominated for most of the preceding two 
decades.  
The progressive Republicans who controlled the convention did not 
envision the constitution’s defeat even though most contemporary observers, 
including Barnes himself, viewed the Republican delegates as overwhelmingly 
conservative.84 Root assigned his progressive Republican allies to key committee 
chairmanships. This careful placement made it difficult for the conservatives to 
mount effective resistance to the reorganization. In key debates, Brackett offered 
the strongest – and longest – arguments for the conservatives, but he was often 
overshadowed by the speeches of the highly respected progressive Republicans.   
The convention’s debate of the executive budget on Aug. 10, 1915, 
illustrated Brackett’s intense fear of executive power and his deep belief in the 
legislature as the true representative of the people. Although the convention had 
no Progressive Party members, the proposal carried common progressive themes 
of consolidation, efficiency, accountability, and executive power. Stimson, a 
member of the “federal crowd,” opened the debate with a defense of the executive 
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budget, arguing that the making of the state budget by a single individual would 
add a measure of accountability to the process. Appealing directly to the 
conservative upstaters, he argued that the executive budget would not weaken the 
legislature but only change its responsibilities. “The only duty that it takes from 
the Legislature is the administrative duty of making a financial plan,” Stimson 
said. “And that administrative duty ought to be in administrative hands … And to 
say that to take that out of the hands of the Legislature is to impair its dignity and 
power is like telling the doctor that when he seeks to keep poison out of the 
stomach, he is an enemy of the stomach and is seeking to destroy its dignity and 
function.” 85 Robert F. Wagner, a Democrat from New York City, was the first to 
speak in defense of the legislature.86 Although he was not explicitly opposed to 
the executive budget, Wagner blamed the state’s rising expenditures on the 
governor and questioned the advisability of placing financial control of the state 
into the hands of one person.87 Wagner argued that the citizens of New York were 
best represented by the legislature and not by “some superhuman being that we 
are going to create in this state.”88 He emphasized the independence of the 
executive and legislative branches, and argued that one should not see its power 
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curtailed by the other. “… But that is a fundamental question upon which I am 
afraid I would not get very much sympathy here,” he said.89 Quigg tellingly 
replied, “The gentleman may get more sympathy than he thinks.”90 
Wagner’s defense of the state’s lawmakers was merely the undercard to 
the main event: Brackett’s lengthy warning about mounting executive power and 
the resulting “autocracy.” 91 Having been involved in the creation of state budgets, 
he mocked the idea that legislators spent state money carelessly.92 He also 
questioned the competence of the “federal crowd” in their moves to disempower 
the legislature, telling them, “… let me certify to you that you do not know what 
you are doing.”93 “I beg the … supporters of the so-called Federal system to bear 
in mind that this continued building up of the executive and this continual tearing 
down of the legislature can lead to but one end,” he said.94 Eight days later, the 
amendment passed 137-4, with Brackett’s being one of the four votes against. 
Still, the large margin in favor of the amendment was misleading, a testament to 
the pre-convention work done by Root in staffing important committees with his 
progressive allies.  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid., 1623. Wagner voted for the amendment, making his words appear as more of a pure 
defense of the legislature instead of a critique of the executive budget.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 1631. Brackett’s complete quote was, “Just as truly as you undermine that legislative 
branch, just so truly you have taken the first step, I care not how small it is, away from 
representative government and toward an autocracy.” 
92 Brackett said he was not against having a person outside the legislature prepare the state’s 
budget but suggested the state comptroller be given the responsibility instead of the governor.  
93 Ibid., 1629. 
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 Around the same time, Barnes, whose only contribution to the convention 
up to that point had been a quickly-defeated anti-social welfare proposal, 
attempted to take control of the conservative upstate faction.95 Following the 
thrashing of Barnes’ proposed amendment, Brown, a good friend to Barnes, sent a 
letter to Tanner and Stimson pointing out what he considered problems with the 
executive budget and short ballot. “The budget amendment and the alleged short 
ballot amendment are objectionable,” Brown wrote. “While they come from 
different committees, they work together to create an autocrat in the Executive 
Chamber.” Later in the same letter, Brown seemed to echo Brackett’s comments 
to the New York Times made three years earlier. He questioned the need for 
moving more power to the executive and wondered whether continuing to strip 
the legislature of its power and influence was a good idea. “There is … the 
gravest need of increasing the attractions of public life at Albany to able, 
ambitious men,” Brown wrote. “There will be no attraction for such men in 
Albany if the Legislature is stripped of power and furnishes no opportunity for a 
career.”96  
Two weeks later, on Aug. 27, as the convention began debating the short 
ballot and the related consolidation amendment, Brackett again took the lead for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 “Barnes in Open To Lead Fight for Reaction,” New York Tribune, Aug. 18, 1915; Wesser, 
Response to Progressivism, 171. In fact, Barnes’ anti-social legislation amendment was the only 
notable action proposed by any upstate conservative at the convention. 
96 Ibid. Brown’s letter, dated Aug. 13, was also read to the convention. The entire letter can be 
found at Record of the Constitutional Convention, 3: 2234-36. 
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the conservatives. He continued to voice fears of the autocracy he believed would 
result if the governor had appointive power over too many state positions. He 
questioned the idea that the people of New York State wanted a short ballot and 
whether they even understood the true meaning of the phrase. His argument 
against the reorganization also cut across lines of geography and class. Brackett, 
who was known for his disdain for New York City, mocked the high-brow pro-
reorganization forces who he said formed their opinions after their weekend visits 
to the Union League or the University Club.97 “You cannot get within a radius of 
10 miles of either of those places and get what is the great sober thought of the 
people, the average people of this state,” Brackett said.98 Brackett also pointed out 
that the leaders of the pro-reorganization group had made their careers in 
executive positions. Wickersham, Stimson, and Root had each held positions in 
the federal executive branch.99 Brackett rejected as paternalism the idea that these 
former federal politicians knew the best course for New York State government. 
William S. Ostrander, a lawyer and Republican delegate from Brackett’s home 
county, spoke against the proposal, saying that it upset the “balances of which 
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Times, July 2, 1915. In it, Brackett is quoted: “It would be better for the state if New York City … 
should take it into its head to secede, than that it should dominate the rest of the state.” Brackett 
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98 Record of the Constitutional Convention, 3:3307-8. 
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were wisely devised by our forefathers.”100  George Green, a Republican delegate 
representing Broome and Delaware counties, read numerous letters from his 
constituents who said they were against the short ballot. Green and Quigg, in his 
speech against the proposal, echoed Brackett in questioning whether average 
voters knew the real meaning of the phrase “short ballot.” “The instant any voter I 
have talked with sees that it means limitation of his right to vote for the offices 
that he has been accustomed to vote for, he tells me that he is against it,” Quigg 
said.101     
Of course, these arguments did not go unanswered. The best of the 
progressive Republican forces – Low, Stimson, and Root – took the floor in 
defense of their handiwork. Like the conservatives, they argued that their plan 
would restore the state’s government to the people.102 Unlike the conservatives, 
however, they emphasized the lack of responsibility and efficiency in state 
government under the current system. They argued that the huge number of 
departments and boards and the fact that many had elected heads made it 
impossible for the governor to manage them effectively. Stimson said he feared 
an “unofficial autocracy” from an irresponsible executive branch more than any 
official autocracy Brackett could dream up. Stimson argued that the doctrine of 
state’s rights required the state government to be efficient in order to prevent the 
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intrusion of the federal government.103 Low and Stimson paved the way for Root, 
who gave a lengthy and impassioned argument for the short ballot and the 
reorganization. He argued that both were voted on and approved in previous 
Republican Party meetings, refuting Brackett’s argument that the ideas were 
simply drawn from thin air by the party’s progressive members. The real targets 
of the amendment, Root said, were boss rule and patronage. He recounted the 
notorious rule of state bosses Roscoe Conkling and Thomas C. Platt and portrayed 
the short ballot and consolidation as ways to prevent such “invisible government.” 
“My friends have talked about this bill’s creating an autocracy,” Root said. “The 
word points with admirable facility [to] the very opposite reason for the bill. It is 
to destroy autocracy and restore power to the people, removable by the people.”104     
When the final vote was taken on the amendment, however, the 
conservatives fared only slightly better than they had on the executive budget. 
The convention voted 124-30 in favor of the amendment. Of the 30 votes against 
the amendment, half came from upstate Republicans and the remainder from 
Democrats. Still, the lopsided votes in favor of the executive budget and the 
reorganization were not indicative of what was to come when the proposed 
constitution went to the voters several months later. The convention wrapped up 
its work in September. The final vote approving the proposed constitution, which 
included the executive budget, short ballot and executive consolidation along with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Ibid., 3355.  
104 Ibid., 3381-89. 
	   	   	  
44	  
	  
31 other amendments, was 118-33 in favor. Quigg voted against it. Barnes voted 
against it at first, saying it would set the course for “state socialism.”105 He later 
changed his vote to “aye,” reasoning that the voters should be able to pass 
judgment on the proposed constitution.106 Brackett declined to vote on the final 
product, but his thoughts on it are well documented.107 In his closing remarks, 
Root took pleasure in repeating the large margins by which the convention 
adopted the 33 new amendments.108 He told the convention that it had done its 
work without regard to party affiliation, but “with a sense of the dignity of the 
people it represented.”109  But Root’s words and the one-sided votes obscured the 
divisions cutting through New York State. A large number of the convention 
Republicans backed the proposed constitution simply as a show of loyalty to the 
party.110 Root’s control of the agenda and committee appointments, as wise as 
they might have been from a progressive standpoint, also served to bury the fault 
lines that otherwise would have become clear during the convention.  
These divisions were laid bare during the campaign for the constitution’s 
ratification. The arguments used by the anti-reorganization men at the convention 
continued in the public forum, but they became more pronounced.111  Brackett, 
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Quigg, and Elon Brown continued to frame the debate around the new 
constitution as one of democracy versus autocracy.112 Quigg equated the 
governorship under the new constitution with despotism.113 He laid out his qualms 
with the proposed constitution in a pamphlet entitled “Mr. Quigg to His 
Constituents Concerning the Constitutional Convention and Its Work.” In it, 
Quigg wrote that he considered the short ballot “dangerous” and “undemocratical 
in principle.”114 He questioned the notion that a governor should be in charge of 
the state budget or the purveyor of laws. “Our governors are governors, 
executives, pure and simple,” he wrote. “They are commanded, as the President is 
commanded, to see to it that the laws are duly executed. In our system they are 
not intended to be originators of law.”115 The progressive Republicans, led by 
Root, Stimson, and Tanner, set out across the state giving speeches in support of 
the new constitution. They formed the Committee of Thirty and flooded the state 
with pro-constitution literature in addition to holding public meetings to explain 
the new document.116 But they found the constitution to be a tough sell in the 
upstate. Republican leaders there either gave lukewarm support to the constitution 
or simply ignored it.117  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Lemuel E. Quigg, ”Mr. Quigg to His Constituents Concerning the Constitutional Convention 
and Its Work,” Box 2, Folder “Constitutional Convention Papers,” Lemuel Quigg 
Correspondence, New-York Historical Society. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Wesser, Response to Progressivism, 176. 
117 Ibid. 
	   	   	  
46	  
	  
The proposed constitution was crushed at the polls, losing by more than 
900,000 votes.118  The campaign against it by the upstate Republicans has 
generally been considered a major reason for its failure.119 Voters in Albany 
County, Barnes’ home, voted against it by a two-to-one margin. Brackett’s 
Saratoga County voted against, 7,250 to 4,250. Conservative upstate counties 
Columbia, Monroe, Steuben, Sullivan, Ulster, and Wayne also returned sizable 
votes against the constitution.120  Brackett, Quigg, and Brown gave voice to a 
continuing backlash against the Progressive Era thinking that preferred executive 
over legislative power. The arguments against a more powerful executive 
resonated for many upstate voters at least partly because of the status of the men 
making them. By 1915, Barnes, Brackett, and Quigg had had lengthy and 
distinguished political careers. They each managed to get themselves elected to 
the constitutional convention even though none held elected office that year. 
Brackett had retired from the state legislature in 1912. Much of Quigg’s political 
career had ended by 1900 and he had since become a lawyer. Barnes had never 
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held elected office but managed the Albany machine until about 1920.121 His 
ownership of the Albany Evening Journal likely played a large role in keeping his 
philosophy relevant to the public. The people of their districts, or in Brackett’s 
case of the entire state, sent them to the convention knowing their views and 
political outlooks. If the politics of these men came from an earlier era, so did the 
beliefs of a majority of their constituencies. In his book on the convention, 
Thomas Schick lists four major reasons for the constitution’s failure at the polls, 
one of which is the fact that re-organization advocates “did not provide for some 
extra form of control over the powerful executive they had created.”122 Writing 
just two years after the convention, scholar Margaret C. Alexander came to the 
same conclusion, except she termed it the “dominant factor” in the constitution’s 
defeat. “It could not be expected that a public which had jealously confined the 
executive power would suddenly enlarge the scope of that power without 
imposing a prompt and effective check upon the exercise of it,” Alexander wrote. 
“The loss of popular control was too heavy a price for efficiency and a 
responsible executive.”123  
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Although most historians consider 1915 to be the height of the Progressive 
Era, the politicians and voters of New York State clearly were not prepared for 
much of the progressive platform. Hughes was the first major state politician to 
advocate for the progressive ideas of increased executive power, administrative 
government, and the direct primary. Upstate Republicans and their conservative 
constituents were not ready for much of his platform and the party regulars fought 
him for most of his two terms. They certainly did not win every battle against 
Hughes, but they helped prevent Kelsey’s removal as superintendent of insurance 
and frustrated every attempt Hughes made to abolish the convention system of 
nomination in favor of the direct primary. The Kelsey case illustrated the strength 
of the upstate faith in the legislature over the executive. But the debate over 
Kelsey also went deeper and delved into notions of party loyalty that conservative 
Republicans held sacred. The Kelsey battle served as a warning that the 
conservative wing of the party was not going to stand by while Hughes ran 
roughshod over the legislature. Conservatives believed allowing the governor to 
remove Kelsey would have set a dangerous precedent and also would have set the 
party on a path to destruction. Hughes’ predilection for a government of 
commissions and experts clearly set him at odds with traditional Republicans, 
who guarded legislative prerogative. Only when goaded with mail from their 
constituents did upstate conservatives agree to vote for Hughes’ Public Service 
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Commissions. At other times, they simply ignored Hughes’ committees and 
commissions, highlighting the continuing struggle between the branches. 
Typically, it took the threat of a loss of votes to move upstate Republicans into 
line with the progressive wing of the party. 
Arguments at the Constitutional Convention of 1915 over the progressive 
initiatives – the consolidation, short ballot, and executive budget – revealed deep 
divisions in the Republican Party. The party split that began with Hughes’ 
gubernatorial terms and intensified with Theodore Roosevelt’s post-presidential 
leftward shift remained very much alive in 1915. The ideological split in the party 
had several general dimensions, but the most notable was the divide between New 
York City and the upstate. The Republican-run Constitutional Convention of 1894 
had put into the state’s fundamental law an apportionment scheme that allowed 
upstate Republicans more representative power than population would have 
otherwise dictated. New York City representatives, especially Democrats, 
complained bitterly about the scheme but were unsuccessful in having it changed. 
Still, Republicans failed to capitalize on their advantage in representation because 
they could not find common ideological ground. The “old guard” upstaters feared 
a strong executive and would not go along with their progressive-minded brethren 
from the city. An upstate party operative put it best following the defeat of the 
proposed constitution in 1915: “The question of whether the Republican 
organization in this State is to be controlled by the Republican leaders in New 
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York City, where the Republican Party is in the minority, or by the leaders up-
State, where Republican majorities come from must be settled without much 
delay for the peace and welfare of the party.”124 
Had the party been able to mend the split, the Progressive Era might have 
come to full fruition in New York State in 1915 with Republicans in the lead. The 
continuing objections of upstaters, however, had two basic effects. First, they 
delayed the major government reorganization envisioned by Hughes in 1906 and 
Root in 1915 until 1926. Second, they gave the Democrats the lead in carrying out 
the reforms necessary to revolutionize the state apparatus. Al Smith, a city 
Democrat who cut his teeth in the legislature while Hughes was governor, became 
the heir to reform in New York State instead of his Republican forerunners. Smith 
was a Democratic delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1915 and played a 
leading role for the minority party. Smith’s experience at the convention 
convinced him of the need for reform of the state government.125 He campaigned 
for governor on a reform platform and was elected in 1918. Smith immediately 
appointed a commission to study reorganization. The commission returned 
recommendations that were very much in line with what the Constitutional 
Convention of 1915 had considered: consolidation of the state’s 187 departments, 
boards, offices, and commissions into 16 departments; a short ballot that included 
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only the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, comptroller, and attorney 
general; and an executive budget.126  
Smith placed the recommendations in front of the 1920 legislature as 
proposed constitutional amendments. The constitution required that proposed 
constitutional amendments pass two consecutive legislatures and then be 
approved by the electorate. In the meantime, Smith lost his bid for re-election in 
1920, and Republican Governor Nathan Miller and the Republican legislatures 
did not pass the reorganization amendments in 1921 and 1922. It was only after 
Smith’s re-election to the governorship in 1923 that the amendments finally 
gained political traction. Smith began touting the reorganization as soon as he 
regained office. Republicans still held both houses of the legislature with strength 
in the upstate areas. This time, however, Smith was able to portray them as 
hindering the right of the people to vote on the proposals. The legislature passed 
the reorganization-short ballot proposal in 1923 but declined on the executive 
budget. The legislature approved the reorganization-short ballot amendment again 
in 1924 and the following year it gained the approval of the voters.127 Hughes, the 
former governor, headed a State Reorganization Commission that created a plan 
for the reorganization, which was finally implemented in January 1927. The 
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executive budget did not receive voter approval until 1927. It was implemented in 
1929.128  
But Smith was dealing with a changing electorate. After 1915, New York 
City became more Democratic thanks to a surge in the registration of immigrants. 
After 1918, Democrats began gaining in upstate urban and suburban areas. 
Albany, for example, a Republican stronghold under Barnes for years, went 
Democratic in 1921.129 This shift helped Democrats gain a higher percentage of 
seats in the legislature despite the unequal apportionment scheme. Smith was also 
a popular governor. Taking a page from Hughes’ playbook, he traveled the state 
making speeches in favor of the reorganization. He also effectively courted the 
press, another similarity he shares with Hughes. Newspapers began portraying 
Republicans who resisted reorganization as obstructionists who were not 
interested in efficiency. Progressive Republicans based in New York City went 
along with Smith and pressured the remainder of the upstate conservatives to do 
so in order to prevent the Democrats from taking all the credit for the 
reorganization. In short, Smith borrowed Hughes’ tactics and capitalized on a 
more favorable political climate to complete what had been started more than 20 
years earlier.130  
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In a way, old guard Republicans can take credit for giving Smith the 
opportunity to orchestrate the reorganization. Men such as Barnes, Brackett, 
Raines, Brown, and Quigg were veterans of politics and knew their constituents 
well. They were able to effectively frame progressive belief in a strong executive 
as an assault on democracy. In their view, legislators were and should remain the 
preeminent voice of the people. Of course, their conception of government fit a 
highly specific profile. Only during elections were upstate conservatives truly 
interested in public opinion. The rest of the time they were mainly interested in 
the will of the party; still, they knew how to play to their bases when necessary. 
One way to do this was to portray progressive Republicans as monarchists bent on 
reducing the popular voice. Associating progressives with “foreign” New York 
City and its crowded and culturally diverse tenements served to frighten their 
white protestant constituents. These tactics and the popularity of the upstate 
conservative leaders allowed them to push the high tide of the Progressive Era in 
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